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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of home country banking regulations on the performance of foreign banks 
in  Luxembourg’s  financial  center.    We  control  for  the  main  regulatory  indicators,  such  as  capital 
requirements, private monitoring, official disciplinary power and restrictions on bank activities, accounting 
for the regulatory regime applied to foreign banks. We also control for the level of GDP in the home country 
and its position in the business cycle.  The two-stage bootstrap method proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) 
is  applied  to  bank  panel  data  covering  1999-2009.    The  analysis  carries  policy  implications  for  bank 
regulators in both home and host countries and provides insight into the choice between establishing a branch 
or a subsidiary, when developing cross-border activities through financial centers.  2 
￿
 
1.  Introduction 
The internationalization of financial services played a central role in the recent crisis, raising challenges for 
regulators,  firms  and  investors.  Financial  centers  have  contributed  in  part  to  the  increasing  integration 
between local and global capital markets and the growth of multinational banks. The attraction of financial 
centers is not just related to favourable fiscal and regulatory frameworks, political stability and adequate 
telecommunication networks, but also to the concept of “going where the business is”: international banks 
establish a presence in financial centers to interact with other banks (Tschoegl, 2000). 
Research on international banking has either focused on the impact of foreign banks on the level of 
banking  competition  in  the  host  country  (Berger,  2007)  or  on  the  impact  of  banking  regulation  and 
supervision  framework  on  performance.  However,  the  literature  has  mostly  neglected  financial  centers, 
although these are a natural laboratory to analyze cross-border banking given that they are mainly composed 
of foreign banks.  
Papers focussing on competition are mostly confined to developing countries and their findings have been 
controversial and inconclusive, in part because they disregard both home and host country characteristics 
(e.g., Sturm and Williams, 2004).  More recently, Sturm and Williams (2008, 2009, 2010) have stressed the 
importance of national factors in analyzing foreign bank efficiency in Australia. Lensink et al. (2008) also 
examined the relationship between foreign bank efficiency and the quality of home and host institutions.  
Other papers focussed on the impact of regulation on bank performance across countries. However, these 
usually use financial ratios as a rough indicator of bank performance instead of applying frontier techniques.  
See Pasiouras et al. (2009), Pasiouras (2008) and Bath et al. (2010) for international evidence.  
Only a handful of papers analyse the performance of foreign banks in financial centers: Rime and Stiroh 
(2003) used data from Switzerland and Kwan (2006) used data from Hong Kong. 
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the performance of foreign banks in financial centers.  Given 
the specific characteristics of financial centers, this analysis requires a modification of the standard research 
procedure. First, since financial centers are mainly composed of foreign banks, it becomes meaningless to 
speak of the effects of foreign banks on domestic banks. Second, since financial centers provide a platform 
where international banks meet through their subsidiaries or branches, the preferred organizational form 
needs to be investigated.  Third, the difference between home and host country characteristics needs to be 
taken into account to measure performance properly.   
The contribution of this paper is twofold.  First, we analyze which organizational form (subsidiary vs. 
branch) perform better when international banks operate in financial centers. Second, we determine which 
home or host country characteristics drive the efficiency of banks in a financial center, while controlling for 
other bank-specific features. 
We study Luxembourg in particular, which has a long tradition as financial center since it started to 
develop international syndicated loans, euro-bonds and euro-currency markets in the 1970s (OECD, 2008). 3 
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Over time, Luxembourg diversified its financial activities while maintaining a favorable fiscal and regulatory 
environment to attract foreign banks (IMF, 2009). 
From a methodological point of view, we integrate two recently developed approaches: the algorithm 
based on group-wise Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Simar and Zelenyuk, 2007) and the algorithm 
based on two-stage DEA (Simar and Wilson, 2007). These allow for more accurate estimates and valid 
statistical inference on aggregated DEA efficiency scores as well as on regression parameters. 
In the first approach, we estimate the efficiency of groups of banks, assuming all banks have access to the 
same nation-specific technology (although the level of efficiency in applying this technology could vary). 
The second approach identifies the main determinants of individual bank efficiency scores. It consist of two 
stages: in the first stage the individual efficiency scores are estimated via DEA and in the second stage they 
are  corrected  for  bias  and  are  regressed  on  a  set  of  explanatory  variables  including  dummy  variables 
identifying bank groups. A truncated regression with a parametric bootstrap is performed for this second 
stage.  
Summing up, this paper extends the current international banking literature along two dimensions: (i) it 
analyzes foreign-bank efficiency in a financial center, (ii) it accounts for different home country regulations 
and  supervision  frameworks.  The  rest  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  provides  a  brief 
background of Luxembourg banking sector. Sector 3 and 4 cover the methodology and the data used, Section 
5 discusses the empirical results and, Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Luxembourg banking sector 
The Luxembourg banking sector is characterized by the strong presence of foreign banks. Initially associated 
with international syndicated loans in the early 1960s, the financial sector went on to introduce euro-bonds 
and euro-currency markets (OECD, 2008).  More recently, Luxembourg developed as a centre for private 
banking and currently is the largest European centre for the domiciliation of investment funds (IMF, 2009). 
Growth was encouraged by tax and regulatory advantages as well as Luxembourg’s swift implementation of 
EU directives (OECD, 2008, 2010).  
Supervisory requirements in Luxembourg differ across three types of banks:  banks incorporated under 
Luxembourg  law  (including  foreign-bank  subsidiaries),  branches  of  banks  incorporated  in  other  EU 
countries, and branches of banks incorporated in countries outside the EU. A foreign bank’s mode of entry 
may reflect regulatory differences between home and host country.  For example, a parent bank may choose 
to establish a subsidiary that will be supervised under Luxembourg law, or it may prefer to establish a branch 
to  remain  subject  to  its  home  supervisor.    Other  aspects  also  affect  the  choice  between  subsidiary  and 
branch : subsidiaries must be at least 50% foreign-owned and the liability of the parent bank is limited to the 
amount of capital invested.  On the other hand, branches are not independently incorporated but are fully 
owned by their foreign parent bank (Cerruti et al., 2007).  Although organizationally less demanding, a 
branch only allows the parent bank to run a limited set of operations in the foreign country (Pozzolo, 2009), 
usually focussing on inter-bank activities.  A subsidiary instead can operate more freely and provides the 4 
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parent bank complete access to the host country in terms of customers served and product/services offered.  
As an international financial center, Luxembourg has relatively few domestic banks.  There are only two 
wholly  state-owned  banks:  Banque  et  Caisse  d’Epargne  de  l'Etat  and  Société  Nationale  de  Crédit  et 
d'Investissement.  In addition, there are also two domestic banks with a mix of public and private ownership 
(Fortuna Banque and Banque Raiffeisen
1) as well as one domestic bank that is privately owned (Compagnie 
de  Banque  Privée).    None  of  them  holds  a  dominant  position  in  any  segment  of  the  market  (loans  or 
deposits).  This low level of domestic competition probably acted as an additional incitement for foreign 
banks to establish a local presence. 
Figure 1 presents the number of banks in Luxembourg, including the breakdown by subsidiaries and 
branches, as well as the evolution of total assets aggregated across banks.  The total number of banks peaked 
in 1994 at 222, mainly due to rapid growth in the number of branches in the preceding two years.  After that, 
the number of both branches and subsidiaries declined to reach a total of 148 in 2009.  Despite, this fall in the 
number of banks, the aggregate balance sheet grew in all years except during the crises of 2002 and 2009.  
This  indicates  that  most  exits  were  through  mergers,  leaving  the  size  of  the  aggregate  balance  sheet 
unaffected, but raising the size of the average bank. 
Figure 1: Number of banks and total assets of the sector 
￿
Source: BCL 
Banks  in  Luxembourg  specialise in  different financial activities.  Formally,  most are  universal banks, 
running both traditional intermediation and financial market activities. However, results in Curi et al., 2010, 
suggest that over time subsidiaries have mostly specialised away from interbank deposits, while branches 
have  developed  a  bimodal  distribution  with  some  concentrating  on  interbank  deposits  while  others 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿Banque Raiffeisen and its local caisses rurales are considered a single credit institution (CSSF, 2007) 5 
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specialised away from them. With respect to the traditional banking activities, branches reinforced their 
specialization, while subsidiaries became more diversified, particularly in interbank deposits. Heterogeneity 
across banks is high in terms of securities held, both for branches and subsidies. Moreover, subsidiaries 
became more diversified, and this is true also with regard to the off-balance activities. On the other hand, 
branches became dedicated business unit of multination banks, allowing the exploitation of international 
operations at the lowest investment requirement.  Clear patterns of convergence appear in interbank lending. 
In customer loans and deposits, evidence of convergence is more tentative. This could be due to the fact that 
retail activities account still too little for the majority of subsidiaries insomuch as they could be easily catched 
up  by  branches.  For  interbank  deposits,  instead,  there  is  evidence  of  divergence  between  branches  and 
subsidiaries.  This  could  reflect  different  structures  of  liabilities  or  differences  in  the  level  of  deposit 
guarantees. Convergence between branches and subsidiaries is found for securities held whereas a divergence 
in  the  off-balance  sheet  activity.  These  differences  suggest  that  multinational  banks  use  branches  and 
subsidies  for  different functions.  Convergence appears  for  those activities requiring  less investment  and 
depending more on technology. Divergence appears for activities that require more labor or skills.  
 
3.  Literature Overview 
In the banking literature, there are three relevant streams of research: the first examines factors determining 
foreign  bank  efficiency;  the  second  investigates  the  impact  of  banking  regulations  in  the  context  of 
international comparisons; the third focuses on financial centers.  
 
Studies on the main determinants of foreign bank efficiency 
European banking markets are increasingly integrated through foreign branches and subsidiaries, as well as 
through cross-border mergers or acquisitions.  However, fears that European banking integration is slowing 
significantly  has  recently  motivated  researchers  to  focus  on  the  main  efficiency  disadvantages  which 
multinational  banks  face  when  operating  in  a  host  country.    A  large  academic  literature  finds  that  in 
developed economies foreign banks tend to perform poorly relative to domestic banks, while the reverse is 
usually true for developing economies (see Berger et al., 2000 and Berger, 2007). For instance, Berger et al. 
(2000) concluded that in France, Germany and the UK, domestic banks have higher cost and profit efficiency 
on average. However, Sturm and Williams (2004) found that in Australia foreign banks were more efficient. 
These papers do not distinguish foreign banks by their nation of the origin, limiting their conclusions. 
The sources of these differences in efficiency have been identified by two different theories. Ricardo's theory 
of comparative advantage suggests that foreign banks must benefit from some core characteristics of their 
home economies which allows them to overcome the diseconomies of operating in distant markets with 
foreign economic, cultural, and regulatory environments (Berger et al., 2004). Instead, the new trade theory 
(Markusen, 1995), suggests that banks with a comparative advantage in management skills are likely to 
export them to host economies that are relatively similar to their home economy.  Thus, under comparative 6 
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advantage, foreign direct investment mostly occurs between dissimilar countries while under the new trade 
theory it occurs between similar countries. 
Sturm and Williams (2008) extended their previous work by disentangling the unspecified nationality 
factors into home nation, parent bank and host nation effects.  Applying general-to-specific modeling to 
control for additional variables, they found that the unspecified nation-specific factors represented by dummy 
variables have no additional explanatory power in explaining bank efficiency.  This evidence rejects the 
comparative advantage hypothesis supported by Berger et al. (2000). Sturm and Williams (2009) took a step 
further. After estimating bank efficiency using parametric distance functions, they derived common factors to 
capture features specific to foreign banks. In Sturm and Williams (2010) they combined general-to-specific 
modeling and extreme bound analysis to evaluate the sensitivity of performance measures in UK banking.  
They found support for the comparative advantages hypothesis of Berger et al. (2000) also controlling for the 
relevance of the new trade theory in explaining foreign bank efficiency.  
At  the  international  level,  Lensink  et  al.  (2008)  examine  the  relationship  between  the  foreign  bank 
efficiency  and  the  quality  of  institutions  in  the  home  and  host  country.  This  paper  finds  that  foreign 
ownership negatively affects bank efficiency although this effect is less pronounced when governance in the 
host country is fairly good. Further, foreign bank inefficiency is reduced by higher quality institutions in the 
home country as well as greater similarity between home and host country.  
 
Studies on the impact of banking regulations on international bank efficiency  
Banks are the most highly regulated industry in the economy (Walter, 1985).  International comparisons of 
bank efficiency have sought to account for the influence of different regulatory regimes.  Starting with 
Dietsch  and  Lozano-Vivas  (2000),  it  has  been  found  that  neglecting  country-specific  regulatory 
characteristics may bias inefficiency estimates in international comparisons.  Initial studies (e.g., Dietsch and 
Lozano, 2000; Grigorian and Manole, 2002) used simple proxies due to data limitations, but more recently, 
Pasiouras (2008) analysed a broad range of regulatory and supervision measures over a wide set of countries.  
Using DEA to estimate bank efficiency in the first stage and Tobit regression to analyse its sources in the 
second stage, he found evidence that technical efficiency is positively influenced by stricter capital adequacy 
standards, more powerful supervisory agencies and more effective market discipline mechanisms.  Pasiouras 
et al. (2009) extended the previous work by exploring the impact of regulatory measures on both cost and 
profit efficiency.  This revealed that higher capital requirements improve cost efficiency but reduce profit 
efficiency,  while  restrictions  on  bank  activities  have  the  opposite  effect,  reducing  cost  efficiency  and 
improving profit efficiency. 
Recently, Bath et al. (2010) examined the impact on bank operating efficiency of regulation, supervision 
and  monitoring.  Applying  DEA  and  then  regressing  inefficiency  scores  on  regulatory  and  other  control 
variables,  the  authors  found  that  tighter  restrictions  on  bank  activities  are  associated  with  lower  bank 
efficiency, while more stringent capital regulation is associated with marginally higher bank efficiency. In 
addition, they found that stronger official supervision is positively associated with higher bank efficiency, 7 
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although only in those countries with independent supervisory authorities. Lastly, market-based monitoring 
of banks (greater financial transparency) is associated with higher bank efficiency. However, these studies do 
not consider either the organizational form of foreign banks or home and host country effects. 
 
Studies on financial centers 
International financial centers are increasingly discussed by academics, regulators and law makers (see Park 
and Essayyad, 1989). The consensus is that these centers must have some distinct features which benefit 
international banking in general and the host country in particular. For instance, financial centers improve the 
international allocation of financial resource by enhancing the integration of local capital markets with global 
markets; they increase local as well as expatriate employment; they promote the internationalization of the 
local  economy;  they  encourage  the  growth  of  multinational  banks  by  providing  a  favorable  fiscal  and 
regulatory  climate.    Thus,  increasing  financial  globalization  is  likely  to  continue  sustaining  growth  in 
financial centers. From the point of view of multinational banks, establishing a presence in financial centers 
is “going where the business is” (Tschoegl, 2000) to meet other banks through subsidiaries and/or branches to 
develop specific business lines (inter-bank activities or trading in the wholesale financial market).  Moreover, 
financial  center  is  the  place  where  multinational  banks  establish  their  subsidiaries  and/or  branches  as 
oligopolistic reaction to the competitors.  Lastly, financial centers provide agglomeration economies which 
benefit banks’ revenues, reduce their costs and encourage innovation. 
In the banking literature, two papers focus on bank efficiency in financial centers: Kwan (2006) and Rime 
et al. (2003).  The first investigates cost efficiency of commercial banks in Hong Kong using standard multi-
product translog cost function and finds that banks move closer to the frontier over time.  On average, large 
banks were less efficient, but the size effect appears to be related to differences in portfolios.  Rime et al. 
(2003) examine the performance of Swiss banks using the distribution-free approach. They found relatively 
large cost and profit inefficiencies, with economies of scale for small and mid-size banks. 
However, these authors simply apply standard bank efficiency tools to analyze financial centers without 
considering  differences  in  organizational  form,  regulatory  scheme  or  business  orientation  (i.e.  more 
diversified versus more specialized foreign banks).  
 
4.  The econometric framework 
In this section we briefly outline the methodology we use to assess foreign bank efficiency and to disentangle 
the effects of home/host regulations and other characteristics. Because the true technology is unknown, we 
estimate it from the data using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Farrell 1957; Charnes et al., 1978).
2  To 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿DEA implicitly assumes that banks have access to the same technology, but the degree of this access, or the level of 
efficiency in using this technology may differ across banks.￿8 
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briefly outline the DEA estimator, let 
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where  } ,... 1 : 0 { n k zk = ≥  are the intensity variables over which the maximization will be made. Under 
certain regularity conditions on the data generating process (DGP), the expression in (1) provides a consistent 
estimator of the unknown technology.
3  Note that at this stage we impose constant returns to scale for the 
DEA estimator to attain greater discriminatory power while measuring all banks to the same (and optimal) 
level of scale and then, at the second stage, we attempt to disentangle the scale effect on efficiency scores by 
including a scale variable (and its square) in the regression
4.  
The DEA estimator has the advantage that it can easily handle multiple inputs and outputs and makes no 
parametric assumptions on the form of the production relationship or the distribution of the inefficiency term.  
DEA can also accommodate cases when some inputs or outputs are zero, which is important in banking, 
where zero values may reflect strategic decisions by bank management.  The main drawback of DEA is that it 
attributes all deviations from the frontier to the inefficiency term, while some of them could be due to noise 
(measurement error or imperfect control). Note, however, that the inputs and outputs in our approach are 
allowed to be random, and moreover, the efficiency level is also allowed to depend on various factors, 
including a random error, and so, to some extent, we deal with the problem of randomness and noise at the 
second (regression) stage of our analysis.  An important issue here is to correct for the bias of DEA efficiency 
estimates, which is why we use the recently developed bootstrap techniques in Simar and Wilson (2007), 
Kneip et al. (2008) and Simar and Zelenyuk (2007).  
Once the technology is estimated, various measures can be used to provide inefficiency scores for each 
bank  and  we  employ  the  radial  distance  to  the  frontier,  according  to  the  Debreu  (1951)-Farrell  (1957) 
criterion. In particular, we use the output-oriented measure of technical efficiency defined as 
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￿￿See Korostelev et al. (1995) and Park et al. (2010) for proof of consistency and rates of convergence of the DEA 
estimator under constant returns to scale.  
￿￿As an alternative to DEA, efficiency can also be measured by stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) (e.g. Park et al. (2008), 
Simar and Wilson (2010), Simar and Zelenyuk (2010) and references cited therein).  9 
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which is a consistent estimator of the true efficiency score from a point  ) , ( y x ￿to the frontier of the true 
technology set in (1). 
Obtaining individual efficiency scores for each bank using (2) is only the first step. We then analyse the 
aggregate efficiency scores of particular groups in the industry.  Intuitively, the aggregation structure we 
employ is based on economic optimization,
5 which yields the weights reflecting the importance of each bank 
within and between groups when averaging efficiency scores.  In particular, we use the price-independent 
weighting scheme derived by Färe and Zelenyuk (2003, 2007) and recently extended to a multi-group context 
by Simar and Zelenyuk (2007).  These weights are based on the aggregates of realized shares of each output 
in the industry.  We then use the Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) algorithm, based on the heterogeneous sub-
sampling bootstrap, to obtain bias-corrected estimates of aggregate efficiency scores for various groups in the 
industry, as well as their confidence intervals, which allow us to test for significant differences in aggregate 
efficiency between groups (see Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) for the technical details). 
  The next step of our analysis explores the relationship between the (non-weighted) individual bank 
efficiency scores and the so-called ‘environmental variables’ that we expect to influence efficiency. When 
DEA efficiency estimates appear as the dependent variable in such second-stage regressions, Simar and 
Wilson (2007) proposed a rigorous procedure that addresses important statistical issues ignored by standard 
regression tools (OLS and Tobit) routinely used in this context. More specifically, we use algorithm 2 of 
Simar and Wilson (2007), which corrects for (i) the bias of DEA estimates, (ii) serial dependence among 
DEA estimates (of unknown structure) and (iii) the DEA-related artefact of placing probability mass at 1 for 
some observations.
6  Formally, the true model we aim to estimate is given by 
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where  k TE   is  the  true  (in)efficiency  score  of  bank  k,  while  k Z
￿
is  the  (row)  vector  of  regressors 
(characteristics  of  bank  k)  that  are  believed  to  influence  the  (in)efficiency  score  of  bank  k  through  the 
(column) vector of parameters β , which we aim to estimate, while  k u  is a random error.   
  Obviously, the true inefficiency score,  k TE , is unobserved and so we replace it with its DEA estimate 
from the first stage, corrected for the bias via the bootstrap procedure that accounts for the production model 
in (1) and the hypothesized structure in (3).  Importantly, because  1 ≥ k TE , we also have  , 1 β k k Z u − ≥ for 
all  n k ,..., 1 =  and, to account for this boundary issue, we use the truncated regression approach, by assuming 
) , 0 ( ~
2
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ε σ  is estimated along with  β .  To improve 
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5 For instance, minimization of costs or maximization of revenues/profits.  
￿￿The model in Simar and Wilson (2007) requires some regularity conditions, including the ‘separability’ assumption 
which could be relaxed in future work.￿10 
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accuracy of inference, we use the parametric bootstrap (reflecting the structure in (3)) to obtain confidence 
intervals around each element in β . This procedure is described in more detail in Simar and Wilson (2007). 
All  the  explanatory  or  environmental  variables  in  k Z   can  be  grouped  into  four  categories:  (i)  the 
macroeconomic  variables,  (ii)  the  regulatory  variables,  which  include  measures  of  capital  requirements, 
private monitoring, official disciplinary power, restrictions on banks activities, (iii) the variables that control 
for bank-specific characteristics, (iv) the variables that control for the subgroups identified at the first step.  
We also include a time dummy, to pick up the effects of particular years.  We discuss these variables in more 
detail in the next section.  
￿
5.  Determinants of bank efficiency 
This section briefly describes the variables considered as possible determinants of foreign bank efficiency in 
financial centers. Following Sturm and Williams (2008), we use two different sets of home-host country 
characteristics (macroeconomic and regulatory variables), also controlling for bank-specific characteristics 
and individual year effects.  
4.1   Country-specific characteristics: economic and regulatory indicators 
 
Economic indicators (home country characteristics) 
In  international  comparisons  of  bank  efficiency,  economic  conditions  are  important.  We  introduce  two 
macroeconomic variables to control for this fact, per capita GDP and business cycle. We control for GDP as 
nations with higher GDP usually have a more efficient banking sector and therefore are more likely to export 
efficient practices (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; Sturm and Williams, 2010). We use quarterly real GDP, 
seasonally adjusted (GDP_CAP) 
We also assume that parent banks could transmit effects of the business cycle in their home economy to 
their subsidiary and/or branches abroad.  Many studies argue there is a close relationship between cyclical 
movements in output and productivity (e.g. Boisso et al., 2000; Basu and Fernald, 2001; Inklaar, 2007).  We 
use the Hodrick-Prescott output gap measure (OUTPUT_GAP) as a proxy of business cycle. This is defined 
as the percentage deviation of observed GDP from its trend.  If this measure is positive, then aggregate 
demand presumably exceeds aggregate supply, generating inflationary pressure; if this measure is negative, 
the reverse holds, possibly slowing growth in prices. 
These two economic indicators, GDP and business cycle are calculated at the home level, i.e. for each 
branch and subsidiary we control for the level of per capita GDP and the position in the business cycle of 
their respective home economy. 
 
Regulatory Indicators (home-host country characteristics)  11 
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The  regulatory,  supervisory  and  monitoring  requirements  to  which  banks  are  subjected,  could  have  an 
important  impact  on  bank  performance.    In  the  past,  data  limitations  have  discouraged  international 
comparisons  from  addressing  this  issue.  However,  three  worldwide  surveys  on  bank  regulation  and 
supervision have recently appeared (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004, 2006, 2008) and are used in this study. 
Following  Pasiouras  (2008),  we  include  variables  to  control  for  the  main  regulatory  measures,  but  we 
distinguish whether it is the regulatory scheme in the home country or the host country that is relevant for 
each foreign bank in the financial center.  The regulatory scheme will be different for subsidiaries and 
branches.  Branches are subject to the supervisor in their home country (that of their parent bank), while 
subsidiaries are subject to the supervisor in the host country where they operate. 
  The variables we consider are related to the three pillars of Basel II, namely capital requirements 
(Pillar 1), official supervisory power (Pillar 2), and market discipline (Pillar 3). The private and the public 
interest  view  (Bath  et  al.,  2006)  provide  conflicting  predictions  about  the  effects  of  regulation  and 
supervision, so empirical studies can help inform policy decisions.    
 
Capital requirement 
The  variable  CAPRQ  is  an  index  of  capital  requirements,  with  higher  values  indicating  greater  capital 
stringency.    Higher  capital  requirements  will  raise  the  cost  of  doing  business  at  a  given  level  of  risk.  
According to the public interest view, capital requirements are believed to play a crucial role aligning the 
incentives of bank owners with those of depositors and other creditors, leading to more careful lending and 
better bank performance (Keeley and Furlong, 1990; Barth et al., 2006).  However, this ignores possible costs 
in the form  of higher  barriers to entry  and  greater rent  extraction  by  governments  (Barth et  al.,  2006).  
Pasiouras (2008) suggests that capital requirements can affect bank efficiency through at least three channels. 
(i) by reducing aggregate lending; (ii) by substituting loans with alternative forms of assets, and (iii) by 
influencing the decisions of banks with regard to the mix of deposits and equity, which bear different costs.  
These  arguments,  associated  with  the  private  interest  view,  would  suggest  that  more  stringent  capital 
requirements are associated with lower bank efficiency. 
 
Private monitoring  
The variable (PRMONT) measures the degree to which banks are forced to disclose information to the public 
and whether there are incentives to increase private monitoring. Higher values indicate more informative 
bank financial statements for auditors and the public. This variable can be considered a general proxy for the 
third  pillar  of  Basel  II.  It  is  related  to  the  private  monitoring  hypothesis  which  notes  that  powerful 
supervision might coexist with corruption or other sources of efficiency loss. However market discipline 
through  private  monitoring  should  always  improve  bank  efficiency  (Barth  et  al.,  2007).    Nevertheless, 
Pasiouras (2008) notes that higher disclosure requirements can also have a negative impact on efficiency as 
they may involve direct and indirect costs, investment in investor relations, coordination among departments, 
and the release of sensitive information to competitors  12 
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Official disciplinary power 
The variable SPOWER is a measure of supervisory agencies ability to take specific actions against bank 
management and directors, shareholders, and bank auditors. Higher values of SPOWER indicate broader and 
greater authority for bank supervisors. This indicator is considered as a proxy of the second pillar of Basel II. 
According to the official supervision hypothesis market failure can be avoided by official supervisors directly 
overseeing, regulating, and disciplining banks. In so far as a powerful supervisor could improve corporate 
governance  within  banks,  reduce  corruption,  and  generally  improve  the  functioning  of  financial 
intermediaries high values of this index should be associated with higher bank efficiency (Beck et al., 2006).  
 
Restrictions on banks activities  
The variable RESTR captures restrictions on bank activities. It reflects whether securities, insurance, real 
estate activities, and ownership of non-financial firms are unrestricted, permitted, restricted, or prohibited. 
Higher values indicate greater restrictions.   
  Barth  et  al.  (2004)  discuss  several  reasons  for  restricting  bank  activities  as  well  as  reasons  for 
allowing banks to participate in a broader range of activities.  On the one hand, allowing a wide range of 
financial activities may lead to increased risk exposure, or to the establishment of complex and powerful 
banks that will be difficult to monitor or discipline and may reduce competition and efficiency.  On the other 
hand, fewer regulatory restrictions may allow economies of scale and scope, increase the franchise value of 
banks and offer opportunities for income diversification.  Barth et al. (2003) also point out that while fewer 
restrictions could provide greater profit opportunities, banks may fail to meet the challenge of managing a 
diverse set of financial activities beyond traditional banking, and hence experience lower efficiency.  
 
4.2  Bank-specific characteristics 
Bank-specific characteristics: Size and risk measures. 
Following the banking literature, we use total assets to measure the size of banks. As in Berger et al. (2010), 
we use a continuous variable, ln(total assets), that is usually preferred to a size dummy variable. We also 
include the squared term of ln(total assets) to control for potential nonlinearities in the relationship between 
size and performance.  
As a proxy of risk, we use bank equity defined as the ratio of equity book value to total assets. Empirical 
evidence suggests that regulators may allow relatively efficient banks to operate with higher leverage, all 
other things being equal (Hughes and Moon, 1995; Hughes and Mester, 1998). Others, such as Altunbas et al. 
(2000, 2007) find that financial capital can significantly influence bank cost and profit efficiency measures. 
 
Group-specific characteristics: organizational form, diversification, parent bank nationality 13 
￿
As mentioned in the introduction, in financial centers the organizational form of foreign banks is important 
given the different regulatory scheme for branches and subsidiaries. While branches are an integral part of the 
parent bank (they draw on the parent’s capital base) and operate in a host country under the authority of the 
home country supervisor, subsidiaries lend on the basis of their own capitalization and are subject to the host 
country supervisor. We define a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is a branch, and 0 otherwise. 
The degree of diversification could affect bank efficiency for two reasons: (i) from the point of view of the 
single bank, diversification could lead to scope economies and cost advantages (ii) from the point of view of 
the  financial  center,  diversification  may  attract  a  wider  set  of  clients.    Following  (Berger  et  al.  2010, 
Mercieca et al., 2007, Acharya et al., 2002), we use the Henfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to measure 
diversification  in  terms  of  bank  assets.  Total  assets  are  disaggregated  into  bank  loans,  customer  loans, 
securities held (including government securities and shares), total fixed assets and other assets. Formally, the 
HHI is given by the following sum of squares: 
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where for each bank i, LOAN_B is loans to other banks, LOAN_C is loans to firms and private households, 
SEC is securities held, FIX_ASS is total fixed assets, Others is other assets and TA is total assets. The index 
varies between 0 and 1, with higher values identifying banks that are more focused (less diversification). 
However, banks with a different composition of total assets may record the same level of the HHI
7. 
Foreign banks originating or active outside the European Monetary Union may face additional costs 
related to currency fluctuations. We therefore consider two groups of banks: those belonging to the euro area 
vs. those which do not. We use two dummy variables, one for each group.  
 
4.3  Period-specific dummy variables 
Lastly, we control for some important events in the host country that may affect foreign bank performance. 
For some specific years, we introduce dummy variables to capture possible economic and structural changes 
that are common across the sector. A dummy for the year 2001 aims to pick up the end of a period of wage 
consolidation, one for 2003 picks up the aftermath of the stock market crisis, one for 2006 picks up the boom 
preceding the financial crisis and one for 2009 picks up the recession after the Lehman Brothers collapse. 
 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿It would also be possible to look at the diversification on the financing sources. However, the level of granularity 
among banks is higher (Stragiotti and Rychtarik, 2009; Curi et al., 2010) and this would lead to smaller sample size of 
each group, which would create some problems for DEA estimation due to the curse of dimensionality.  14 
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5.  Data and sources 
We work with bank reporting data provided by the Central Bank of Luxembourg (BCL).  The sample covers 
the period 1999:Q1-2009Q4 and consists mostly of commercial banks involved in both customer and inter-
bank activities.  First, we take annual averages to avoid seasonal effects: for the stock variables (from the 
balance sheet), we take the average of the four consecutive quarters, while for flow variables (from the profit-
and-loss  account)  we  report  the  year-to-date  values.  Second,  we  exclude  banks  missing  balance  sheet 
information.  These are mainly branch banks, which face lower reporting requirements because they are 
regulated  and  supervised  by  their  home  country  authorities.    Lastly,  we  remove  possible  outliers  by 
inspecting the distribution of estimated efficiency scores.  The final sample is an unbalanced panel of banks. 
Note, however, that we do not omit banks with zero values in inputs or outputs as they may represent 
strategic choices by bank management (Thompson et al., 1993).  Data in nominal values are converted to real 
terms using the GDP deflator with base year 1995.  We use unconsolidated statements. 
Our choice of bank inputs and outputs is based on the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) 
which is common in the bank efficiency literature (Berger and Humprey, 1997).  On the input side, we select 
(i) labor, measured by total labor expenses, (ii) capital, measured by fixed assets, (iii) interbank deposits, and 
(iv)  customer  deposits.    On  the  output  side,  we  select  interbank  loans,  customer  loans  and  securities.  
However, as discussed in Curi et al. 2010, Luxembourg banks increasingly rely on net commission income, 
so we also include non-interest income as proxy for off-balance sheet activities.  Note that interbank activities 
includes those within the parent banking group as well as with other banks.  Customer activities include those 
with households and with non-financial corporations.  Securities include government securities, fixed-income 
securities, shares, participations and other variable-income securities. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of input and output variables by subgroup.  Subsidiaries appear to 
be more labor intensive than branches (approximately six times more labour costs on average) and have 
higher fixed investments. The average subsidiary bank is more involved in customer, securities and non-
traditional activities.  However, on average subsidiaries and branches are similar in interbank activity (for 
more  discussion  of  the  differences  between  subsidiaries  and  branches  see  Curi  et  al.,  2010).    We  also 
distinguish between diversified banks (HHI below 0.6) and focused banks (HHI above 0.6), where 0.6 is the 
mode  of  the  kernel  estimated  density  of  the  HHI  across  banks.    The  average  diversified  bank  use 
approximately twice as much inputs as the average focused bank and is (four times) more capital intensive. 
On the output side, they differ in customer lending and securities. Lastly, the average non-European bank is 
less  involved  in  interbank,  customer  and  securities  activities.  Although  on  average  European  and  non-
European banks are similar in non traditional activities. 15 
￿
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used to estimate bank technical efficiency. 
      Subsidiary banks     Branch banks    
   Obs.  Mean  Std Dev.     Obs  Mean  Std Dev.    
Ratio 
Mean 
Labor  1227  12,092,157  22,371,661    299  1,903,994  4,921,832    6.35 
Capital  1227  104,761,440  218,142,543    299  990,627  2,140,470    105.75 
Interbank Deposits  1227  2,382,471,212  4,980,401,444    299  1,918,695,969  3,929,373,789    1.24 
Customer Deposits  1227  1,392,652,295  2,668,355,369    299  497,703,363  847,949,912    2.80 
                   
Interbank Loans  1227  1,896,412,480  4,066,248,127    299  1,817,156,227  3,731,337,213    1.04 
Costumer Loans  1227  898,894,486  2,126,884,339    299  277,829,571  717,444,293    3.24 
Securities  1227  1,105,501,716  2,414,879,031    299  334,382,874  1,016,328,641    3.31 
Non Interest 
Income  1227  26,123,228  41,207,740    299  4,700,637  11,990,650    5.56 
￿￿ ￿￿ Diversified banks        Focused banks    
￿￿ ￿￿ Mean  Std Dev.        Mean  Std Dev.    
Ratio 
Mean 
Labor  989  12,440,176  24,341,037  ￿ 537  5,778,469  9,158,089    2.15 
Capital  989  20,291,074  56,947,218  ￿ 537  4,754,634  10,296,057    4.27 
Interbank Deposits  989  2,794,017,940  5,084,553,618  ￿ 537  1,366,291,487  4,054,465,664    2.04 
Customer Deposits  989  1,511,065,466  2,823,096,401  ￿ 537  676,264,294  1,379,025,610    2.23 
        ￿          
Interbank Loans  989  1,986,025,989  3,751,760,504  ￿ 537  1,687,240,451  4,422,593,366    1.18 
Costumer Loans  989  1,108,373,472  2,312,863,084  ￿ 537  167,287,173  608,900,005    6.63 
Securities  989  1,336,670,622  2,575,532,977  ￿ 537  250,398,213  1,089,227,390    5.34 
Non Interest 
Income  989  25,357,612  42,987,942  ￿ 537  15,605,238  26,490,398    1.62 
￿￿ ￿￿ Euro Area banks        Non-Euro Area banks    
￿￿ Obs.  Mean  Std Dev.     Obs.  Mean  Std Dev.    
Ratio 
Mean 
Labor  962  11,820,994  24,771,860  ￿ 564  7,153,502  9,263,953    1.65 
Capital  962  20,195,980  57,931,361  ￿ 564  5,660,599  8,902,653    3.57 
Interbank Deposits  962  3,399,658,310  5,732,146,405  ￿ 564  401,615,208  719,171,008    8.46 
Customer Deposits  962  1,617,267,712  2,924,458,175  ￿ 564  535,081,797  943,133,294    3.02 
        ￿          
Interbank Loans  962  2,618,600,885  4,834,424,666  ￿ 564  622,577,614  983,844,986    4.21 
Costumer Loans  962  1,072,764,175  2,368,046,013  ￿ 564  273,077,020  558,771,781    3.93 
Securities  962  1,469,012,527  2,675,166,089  ￿ 564  76,668,501  244,565,857    19.16 
Non Interest 
Income  962  24,704,854  43,703,745  ￿￿ 564  17,185,501  25,959,112     1.44 
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Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the environmental variables used in the second 
stage.  Country-specific  variables  come  from  two  different  sources.  Data  for  regulatory  and 
supervisory  variables  (capital  requirement,  private  monitoring,  official  disciplinary  power, 
restrictions  on  banks  activities)  were  obtained  from  the  database  developed  by  Barth  et  al. 
(2007).  These indicators cover all our home countries for the years 2001, 2003, 2005, except for 
Norway in 2001 and Turkey in 2005.  Macroeconomic indicators (gross domestic product and 
output gap) were obtained from Eurostat and own calculations. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the environmental variables used in the second stage. 
Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Variables 
Subsidiary  Branch  Subsidiary  Branch  Subsidiary  Branch 
             
CAPRQ  30.64  29.58  26.38  26.38  12.77  11.43 
ACTRS  8.24  7.83  8.00  7.00  2.38  2.79 
PRMONT  8.77  8.69  9.00  10.00  2.32  2.50 
SPOWER  10.82  10.42  10.00  10.00  4.50  4.58 
GDP_CAP  25,436  22,551  23,567  23,256  9,206  8,392 
OUTPUT_GAP  0.13  0.11  0.19  0.19  1.32  1.43 
Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Variables 
Diversified  Focused  Diversified  Focused  Diversified  Focused 
CAPRQ  30.81  29.73  26.38  26.38  13.08  11.41 
ACTRS  8.06  8.34  8.00  8.00  2.38  2.62 
PRMONT  8.82  8.63  10.00  9.00  2.32  2.41 
SPOWER  10.61  10.99  10.00  11.00  4.40  4.73 
GDP_CAP  23,710  24,883  23,366  23,544  7,915  9,124 
OUTPUT_GAP  0.13  0.13  0.24  0.13  1.34  1.34 
Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Variables 
Euro   Non-Euro  Euro   Non-Euro   Euro   Non-Euro  
CAPRQ  29.17  32.58  26.38  28.00  10.90  14.66 
ACTRS  7.56  9.19  7.00  9.00  2.07  2.74 
PRMONT  8.78  8.70  10.00  8.00  2.37  2.33 
SPOWER  9.30  13.21  9.00  13.00  3.48  5.00 
GDP_CAP  24,883  28,941  23,544  33,782  9,124  13,675 
OUTPUT_GAP  0.18  0.05  0.24  -0.01  1.26  1.47 
 
6.  Results 
We first present results on foreign bank efficiency in Luxembourg. Given the heterogeneity 
among banks in term of organizational form, level of diversification and parent bank nationality, 
we report group efficiency with weights derived from economic optimisation. The results from 
this first stage of analysis provide some insights about which characteristics should be considered 17 
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as possible determinants of efficiency among foreign banks in financial centers.  We then report 
results from the second-stage regressions which estimate the effects of home country regulations, 
as well as country– and group-specific characteristics. 
6.1  . Group efficiency results 
￿
  Table 3 presents the first stage results based on the group-wise heterogeneous bootstrap 
methodology  of  Simar  and  Zelenyuk  (2007).  We  control  for  heterogeneity  due  to  different 
organizational  forms  (subsidiary  vs.  branch),  level  of  asset  diversification  (diversified  vs. 
focused banks) and exchange rate risk (euro area vs. non-euro area). The results suggest that on 
average, branch banks are 50% more efficient than subsidiary banks.
8 Furthermore, diversified 
banks are more efficient than focused banks (about 8% more) and banks belonging to the euro 
area are more efficient than those of the non-euro area (about 25% more efficient).  
To  compare  group  inefficiency  scores,  we  employ  relative  difference  (RD)  statistics 
based on ratios of the means of groups (see Simar and Zelenyuk ,2007, for details). In all cases, 
the  differences  in  performance  between  groups  are  statistically  significant,  since  unity  falls 
outside the confidence intervals of RD statistics (Table 4, column 5 and 6). Thus, we reject the 
pair-wise null hypothesis that aggregate efficiency is the same across groups based on the 95% 
bootstrap confidence interval. The weighted group efficiency scores are smaller that the mean 
and the median efficiency score within each group, suggesting that larger banks are typically 
more efficient. This would be consistent with the existence of economies of scale within each 
group. The only exception is for non-euro area banks, possibly because most of them are smaller 
in the output dimensions.  
The results indicate that each of the groups considered may have intrinsic characteristics 
that should not be neglected when studying candidate determinants of foreign bank efficiency in 
Luxembourg. In addition, size appears to plays an important role in explaining efficiency. 
  Column three of Table 3 reports the bias term obtained using bootstrapping techniques. 
The  estimated  bias  is  negative  for  all  weighted  group  efficiency  terms,  suggesting  that  our 
original  efficiency  (inefficiency)  is  overestimated  (underestimated).    The  standard  deviation 
reported in the following column indicates that the estimated bias is statistically different from 
zero in nearly all cases.  The final two columns provide the lower bound (LB) and upper bound 
(UB)  of  the  95%  confidence  interval  of  the  bias-corrected  group  efficiency  scores.    These 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿Recall that we measure efficiency of Banks relative to CRS technology, i.e. relative to the productivity 
level of optimal scale, which usually yields higher differences in efficiency between banks than otherwise. 18 
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indicate  that  the  efficiency  measure  is  statistically  significant  in  all  cases.  Although,  as  we 
pointed out before, these results show that branch banks are around 50% more efficient than 
subsidiary banks, however both branches and subsidiaries in Luxembourg appear to have room 
to increase their efficiency. While branch banks might have increased their output 26.4% with an 
unchanged level of inputs, subsidiary banks might have increased it by around 60%. Comparing 
diversified and focused banks, the results show that for diversified banks efficiency is 0.427 and 
for focused banks it is 0.374. Finally, for euro-area banks efficiency is 0.432, while for non-euro 
area banks efficiency is 0.286. Overall, every group of foreign banks could have increased output 
while keeping inputs unchanged. 19 
￿









Est.Bias   Stand. 
Dev.  LB  UB 
Subsidiary   1.834  2.517  -0.684  0.096  2.232  2.611 
Branch   1.268  1.359  -0.091  0.113  1.021  1.478 
             
Diversif.  1.750  2.342  -0.592  0.104  2.018  2.444 
Focused   1.916  2.666  -0.750  0.108  2.350  2.771 
             





2.327  3.497  -1.170  0.103  3.177  3.599 
Subsidiary   2.146  3.109  -0.963  0.132  2.709  3.220 
Branch   1.638  2.062  -0.423  0.149  1.632  2.204 
             
Diversif.  1.912  2.638  -0.725  0.137  2.238  2.750 
Focused   2.297  3.381  -1.084  0.155  2.918  3.512 
             





2.193  3.202  -1.009  0.141  2.782  3.320 
Subsidiary   1.945  2.782  -0.837  0.086  2.525  2.864 
Branch   1.448  1.771  -0.322  0.102  1.474  1.878 
             
Diversif.  1.822  2.528  -0.706  0.096  2.238  2.615 
Focused   2.010  2.892  -0.882  0.105  2.576  2.991 
             





2.025  2.940  -0.915  0.097  2.646  3.036 
Source: Author’s calculations. Raw Agg. Eff= group efficiency estimates; BC Agg. Eff= Bias-
Corrected efficiency estimates; Est. Bias= Estimated bias, LB=Lower bound and UB= Upper 
Bound.  20 
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Table 4: RD statistics for comparing group efficiency score  





Eff.  Est.bias  
Stand. 
Dev.  LB  UB 
Subsidiary vs. 
Branch   1.446  1.913  -0.467  0.047  1.828  2.012 
Diversif.  Vs. 




Efficiecy  Euro vs. Non-Euro 
Area  0.746  0.492  0.253  0.038  0.413  0.571 
Subsidiary vs. 
Branch   1.245  1.516  -0.27  0.042  1.436  1.612 
Diversif.  Vs. 
Focused   0.765  0.525  0.24  0.03  0.461  0.583 
Ratio  Mean 
Group 
Efficiency 
Euro vs. Non-Euro 
Area  0.917  0.828  0.089  0.036  0.758  0.904 
Subsidiary vs. 
Branch   1.27  1.555  -0.284  0.042  1.472  1.646 
Diversif.  Vs. 




Euro vs. Non-Euro 
Area  0.897  0.791  0.106  0.044  0.7  0.882 
Source: Author’s calculations 
As  far  as  overall  efficiency  is  concerned,  table  5  reports  that  the  entire  industry  is 
operating at 56.1% efficiency, meaning the banks could have increased their output two-fold, 
given the level of inputs.  
Table 5: Overall efficiency of the financial sector.  
Statistics   Raw Agg. 
Eff.  





Dev.  LB  UB 
Weighted Group 
Efficiency   1.781  2.405  -0.624  0.097  2.119  2.498 
Mean Group 
Efficiency   2.048  2.906  -0.857  0.134  2.509  3.023 
Median Group 
Efficiency   1.857  2.601  -0.744  0.086  2.346  2.685 
Source: Author’s calculations. Raw Agg. Eff=Efficiency Estimate; BC Agg. Eff=Bias-Corrected 
efficiency estimates; Est. Bias=Estimated Bias; LB=Lower bound and UB= Upper Bound. 21 
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6.2  . Second stage regression results 
In the second stage of the analysis, we investigate possible determinants of efficiency by 
estimating the econometric model described in equation (3) above using the individual bank bias 
corrected inefficiency score as the dependent variable, and the set of macroeconomic, regulatory 
and  bank-  and  group-specific  characteristics  described  above  as  independent  variables.  The 
parameters  are  estimated  according  to  algorithm  2  of  Simar  and  Wilson  (2007),  with  1000 
bootstrap replications for the bias correction and 1000 bootstrap replication for the confidence 
intervals.  
The  estimation  results  are  reported  in  Table  6.  As  discussed  above,  for  branches  the 
regulatory variables are based on the home country, while for subsidiaries we have used the host-
country values. For the macroeconomic variables, instead, only home-country levels are used. 
Given that the groups considered in the first stage had statistically different results, we identify 
them in the regression analysis. In particular, we introduce dummies for branch banks and banks 
belonging to the euro area.  To distinguish diversified and focused banks, we prefer to use the 
continuous variable HHI variable as suggested by Berger et al. (2010) because of its higher 
explanatory power.  
The results obtained in our second stage regression support the hypothesis that more stringent 
regulation,  supervision and  monitoring  do  not  boost  efficiency  of  foreign  banks  in financial 
centers.  Capital  stringency  appears  to  have  a  positive,  but  insignificant,  impact  on  bank’s 
efficiency. This is not in line with previous findings by Pasiouras et al. (2009) and Barth et al. 
(2010). Restrictions on bank activities have a negative and statistically significant impact on 
efficiency (greater restrictions lead to lower technical efficiency). This is consistent with findings 
in Pasiouras et al. (2009) as well as in Barth et al. (2010). Private monitoring also has a negative 
statistically  significant  impact  on  the  technical  efficiency,  implying  that  higher  disclosure 
requirements do not seem to enhance foreign bank efficiency in Luxembourg.  Lastly, the power 
of the supervisory agencies also has a negative statistically significant impact on efficiency, 
while Pasiouras et al. (2009).found a positive effect and Barth et al. (2010) found no significant 
effect. The differences in the results relative to regulatory measures might be due either to the 
different sample of countries or differences in the methodology. In particular, previous studies do 
not accurately identify the relevant regulatory scheme according to organizational form. 
Overall, the results are not consistent with the public interest view, as higher regulation does 
not  appear  to  enhance  the  efficiency  of  foreign  banks  in  Luxembourg.  Higher  capital 
requirements appear to have no significant effect, while a more powerful supervisory agency 
may  actually  be  detrimental  to  bank  efficiency.    Lastly,  stronger  disclosure  requirements 
associated with the third pillar of Basel II have a negative and statistically significant impact on 
bank efficiency. Summing up, the results obtained about the effect of regulation on the efficiency 22 
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of foreign banks of the financial center are more consistent with the private interest view than 
with the public interest view.  
Macroeconomic conditions at the home country level do not appear to affect bank efficiency 
in  Luxembourg.  Our  results  provide  little  evidence to  support the  limited  global advantages 
hypothesis of Berger et al (2000). GDP_CAP does not appear to have a positive impact on 
efficiency, but the home country business cycle seems to be positively associated with higher 
efficiency, although the coefficient is not statistically significant.  
The regression results suggest that the organizational form does not play an important role in 
determining efficiency as the branch dummy has a negative but insignificant coefficient.  This 
suggests that the differences between branches and subsidiaries described earlier disappear when 
controlling for other characteristics in a multivariate context.  The home country of the parent 
bank appears to be significant, as the coefficient on the euro-area dummy variable suggests a 
significant impact on efficiency.  For diversification, higher values of HHI are associated with 
lower efficiency levels. This suggests that higher levels of specialization penalise efficiency. 
However, when this variable is crossed with the branch dummy, an improvement in efficiency 
appears.  This  suggests  that  specialised  branches  are  performing  better  than  specialised 
subsidiaries. This result  is  relevant  to  the debate  on  which  organizational  form  is  better for 
developing cross-border activities. 
In terms of bank-specific characteristics, we do not found that squared term of log(assets) is 
significantly associated with higher efficiency.  This suggests that there are not a non-monotonic 
relationship  between  size  and  performance.  The  term  log(assets)  instead  carries  significant 
relationship with efficiency. These results suggest that although it seems that there not exist a 
limit point on size from which larger foreign banks are more efficient, it is true that larger banks 
are  more  efficient.  The  ratio  of  equity  to  total  assets  has  a  positive  impact  on  efficiency 
indicating that well capitalized banks tend to be better run. Finally, when controlling for the 
certain events in the host country over the sample period the results show that banks saw a 
systemic improvement in efficiency during the boom prior to the financial crisis.  
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Table 6: Truncated regression results 
90%  95%  99%     Variable   Estimates  
LB   UB   LB   UB   LB   UB  
Constant  0.773  -3.119  4.482  -4.212  5.613  -7.912  8,033 
￿              
Regulatory measures                
CAPRQ  -0.018  -0.036  0.000  -0.038  0.003  -0.046  0.011 
ACTRS  0.127**  0.034  0.234  0.015  0.258  -0.025  0.296 
PRMONT  0.164**  0.046  0.276  0.029  0.290  -0.024  0.325 
SPOWER  0.049***  0.017  0.084  0.009  0.091  0.001  0.105 
               
Macroeconomics measures                
Log (GDP_CAP)  0.674***  0.474  0.855  0.428  0.889  0.344  0.951 
OUTPUT_GAP  -0.038  -0.138  0.055  -0.152  0.072  -0.189  0.115 
               
Organizational Structure                
Branch   -0.357  -1.418  0.720  -1.631  0.886  -2.030  1.310 
               
Home parent bank nationality                
Euro Area  -0.347***  -0.549  -0.161  -0.585  -0.124  -0.686  -0.059 
               
Asset Diversification                
HHI  2.734***  2.117  3.346  2.005  3.468  1.797  3.710 
HHI x Branch   -2.089**  -3.569  -0.525  -3.799  -0.201  -4.325  0.355 
               
Bank-specific characteristics               
Equity/ assets  -4.268***  -5.601  -2.840  -5.889  -2.579  -6.191  -1.758 
Ln (assets)  -0.419*  -0.730  -0.106  -0.819  0.007  -1.067  0.311 
Squared ln(assets)  -0.002  -0.010  0.006  -0.013  0.008  -0.020  0.015 
               
Year dummy                
End major consolidation wage  0.184  -0.153  0.540  -0.219  0.604  -0.329  0.721 
Stock Market Crisis   0.105  -0.202  0.442  -0.260  0.525  -0.371  0.680 
Pre-Global Financial Crisis   -0.603**  -1.014  -0.192  -1.066  -0.105  -1.157  0.043 
Global Financial Crisis   0.056  -0.309  0.407  -0.381  0.473  -0.575  0.637 
               
  2
ε σ   1.950  1.717  2.218  1.655  2.260  1.549  2.308 
 *, **, *** stand for statistically significant at 90%, 95%, 99%, respectively.  24 
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7.  Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In this paper we analyze the impact of home country characteristics on foreign bank efficiency, 
focusing on a financial center.  We employ bootstrap techniques both in our first-stage Data 
Envelopment  Analysis  and  in  our  second-stage  truncated  regression.  The  set  of  explanatory 
variables in the second-stage regression includes home-country characteristics of parent banks as 
well  as  bank-specific  characteristics.    As  an  innovation  in  the  field  of  international  bank 
efficiency, we distinguish the relevant regulatory scheme according to the bank’s organization 
form  (subsidiary  or  branch).  We  focus  on  the  Luxembourg  financial  center  as  a  laboratory 
composed mostly of foreign banks over the period 1999-2009. DEA results indicate that branch 
banks, more diversified banks and euro area banks have higher technical efficiency on average.  
 
The results of the second-stage regression seem to support the need to review the current home-
host  model  of  bank  regulation.  More  stringent  regulation  and  supervision  do  not  appear  to 
enhance foreign bank efficiency. Even when controlling for other characteristics, well capitalized 
and more diversified banks tend to be more efficient, supporting the private interest view of the 
impact of regulation on bank efficiency.  Since efficiency is barely affected by home country 
economic conditions, our results also suggest that multinational banks establish a presence in 
financial centers mostly to “go where the business is”.  In terms of the choice of organizational 
form, branches appear to perform better than subsidiaries if they are specialized, and subsidiaries 
do better when following diversified business lines.  25 
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